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TORTS - MASTER AND SERVANT - NEGLIGENT HIRING -
EMPLOYER OWES A DUTY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC TO USE
REASONABLE CARE IN HIRING AND RETAINING EM-
PLOYEES. EVANS v. MORSELL, 284 Md. 160, 395 A.2d 480
(1978).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Evans v. Morsell, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
an employer ordinarily has no duty to inquire into the criminal
record of a prospective employee. The court concluded that the
tavern owner in Evans was not liable under the theory of negligent
hiring for injuries sustained by a patron who had been assaulted by
a bartender because the owner had conducted a reasonable inves-
tigation into the bartender's fitness for employment and otherwise
had possessed a sufficient basis for relying upon the employee. The
significance of the specific holding in Evans is underlined by the fact
that it is the first reported Maryland decision to recognize that under
the theory of negligent hiring an employer may be liable to a
member of the general public for damages occasioned by an
employee.2 Prior to Evans, an employer who breached his duty to use
due care in the selection and retention of employees was potentially
liable only to his own employees who were injured by negligently
hired co-employees. This casenote discusses the salient characteris-
tics of Maryland's recently expanded tort of negligent hiring and
analyzes the court of appeals' holding that an employer's investiga-
tion into a job applicant's criminal background is ordinarily
unnecessary.
1. 284 Md. 160, 395 A.2d 480 (1978).
2. The theory of negligent hiring was recognized by Judge Shearin in Blum v.
National Servs. Indus., Law No. 37,669 (Cir. Ct. Mont. Co., Md. 1975). See note
94 infra. In overruling the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiffs' cause of
action alleging negligent hiring, the trial court in Blum noted that, at that
time, Maryland only recognized an employer's liability for negligent hiring in
the case of a serious, willful tort committed by an employee against a fellow
servant. Judge Shearin, however, acknowledged the theory of negligent hiring
as a proper avenue for Blum, a non-employee, to pursue and stated that,
because this was a case of first impression in Maryland, the parties should test
the theory on appeal in order to clarify this area of the law. The jury returned a
verdict of over thirteen million dollars for the plaintiffs. Over two million
dollars of this recovery was based on the alleged theory of negligent hiring. The
defendant filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland and
petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The
court of appeals issued a writ of certiorari for the September Term 1975. A
consent decree was signed before oral argument, noting that the case had been
"agreed, settled, and satisfied." Therefore, the court of appeals did not address
this issue until it was raised for consideration in Evans v. Morsell.
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II. THE EVANS FACTS
The controversy in Evans v. Morsell stemmed from a suit
against a tavern owner by a customer seeking compensatory and
punitive damages for personal injuries sustained when he was shot,
while in the tavern, by a bartender who had been hired by the
owner.3 When the bartender, Hopkins, was hired in 1972, he had a
significant criminal record, including several convictions in the
1950's and 1960's for assault. The defendant, Morsell, was unaware
of Hopkins' convictions and made no inquiry concerning a possible
criminal record.4 The plaintiff, Evans, contended that because a
bartender necessarily has frequent contact with the public, a
proprietor has a duty to investigate whether such an employee has a
criminal record.' The suit was premised on the ground that Morsell's
failure to conduct this investigation rendered him liable for his
customer's injuries under the theory of negligent hiring.
6
At the time Morsell purchased the tavern and in the course of
looking for suitable employees, he questioned the former owner
about the qualifications of his prior workers. In response to this
inquiry, he was told that Hopkins was a "good worker and a person
whom [Morsell] should employ."7 Hopkins had worked for the former
owner for eighteen months, and during that period he had neither
fought with nor assaulted any person in the tavern.' In addition, the
defendant, in his previous position as a police officer, had known
Hopkins and had never experienced any difficulty with him.9
Furthermore, from the time Morsell hired Hopkins until the day of
the shooting, over four months later, the defendant was unaware of
3. 284 Md. 160, 161, 395 A.2d 480, 481 (1978). Plaintiff returned to defendant's
bar after being asked to leave and, apparently without further provocation, the
bartender shot the plaintiff numerous times with a shotgun that the tavern
owner kept on the premises. The tortfeasor was convicted of assault and
sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. Id. at 162, 395 A.2d at 481.
4. Brief for Appellant at E-44, E-51, Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 395 A.2d 480
(1978).
5. 284 Md. 160, 164, 395 A.2d 480, 482 (1978).
6. Because the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant was vicariously liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior or liable under the doctrine of
negligent entrustment with respect to the shotgun, only the theory of negligent
hiring was considered by the court. Id. at 164 n.2, 395 A.2d at 482-83 n.2.
7. Id. at 163, 395 A.2d at 482.
8. Id. The former owner said that, although Hopkins would occasionally "go on a
drunk," he never got drunk in the tavern. Id.
9. Morsell had been a police officer in Baltimore City for 17 years. Id. He knew
Hopkins personally inasmuch as his post included the area in which the bar




any actions on the part of his employee that indicated he posed a
threat to persons entering the tavern.'0
At trial, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was
granted at the close of all evidence." Evans appealed the decision,
whereupon the Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a writ of
certiorari prior to a hearing in the court of special appeals.,2
III. BACKGROUND: EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY TO THIRD
PERSONS FOR ACTIONS OF EMPLOYEES
There are three possible theories whereby an employer may be
liable for the wrongful acts of his employee:13 negligent
entrustment,"' negligent hiring, 5 and respondeat superior. 6 In order
to identify which doctrine is applicable to a particular set of
circumstances, it is necessary to highlight the differences among
these three concepts. Under the theories of negligent entrustment
and negligent hiring, an employer's liability is based upon his own
primary negligence. 7 Negligent entrustment arises as a result of
supplying a chattel to a person who the supplier knows or has reason
to know is likely to use the chattel in a manner involving
10. The plaintiff testified that on previous occasions he had seen Hopkins drunk
and arguing with other customers. He did not testify, however, to any facts
indicating that Morsell was present on such occasions or that Morsell had any
knowledge of these alleged arguments. 284 Md. 160, 162, 395 A.2d 480, 481-82
(1978). Morsell testified that he had never had any or known of any difficulty
with Hopkins. Id. at 163, 395 A.2d at 482.
11. Id. at 164, 395 A.2d at 482. Because the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict, the court of appeals considered the evidence, to
the extent that it was conflicting, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.
at 161 n.1, 395 A.2d at 481 n.1. Accord, Le Pore v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 Md. 591,
592, 207 A.2d 451, 452 (1965). See generally Lynch, Directed Verdict In
Maryland: Less Obvious Applications Of A Simple Rule, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 217
(1980).
12. 284 Md. 160, 164, 395 A.2d 480, 482 (1978). The court of appeals granted
certiorari in advance of oral arguments in the court of special appeals pursuant
to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-203 (1980).
13. See Comment, Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment: The Case Against
Exclusion, 52 OR. L. REV. 296 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Negligent Hiring and
Negligent Entrustment].
14. See, e.g., Woods, Negligent Entrustment: Evaluation of a Frequently Overlooked
Source of Additional Liability, 20 ARK. L. REV. 101 (1966). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS §§ 308, 390 (1965).
15. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 307 (1965); 53 Am. JUR. (SECOND) Master and Servant § 422
(1970); 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 559 (1948).
16. See, e.g., Brill, The Liability of an Employer for the Wilful Torts of His Servants,
45 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1968). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY
§ 219 (1958).
17. See Rounds v. Phillips, 168 Md. 120, 123, 177 A. 174, 175 (1935) (negligent
entrustment); Porter v. Grennan Bakeries, 219 Minn. 14, 22-23, 16 N.W.2d
906, 909-10 (1944) (negligent hiring).
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unreasonable risk of physical harm to others." Negligent hiring also
creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to others as a result of
an employer hiring or retaining an employee with dangerous
propensities. 9 Because of these similarities, courts often fail to
distinguish the two theories and occasionally label negligent hiring
as negligent entrustment."
The doctrine of respondeat superior is the most well-established
theory of employer tort liability.2' Under this doctrine, liability
results as a consequence of an employer's responsibility for the
wrongful acts of employees that occur within the scope of
employment.2 2 Although actions for negligent hiring and those
brought under the doctrine of respondeat superior involve the same
three parties - plaintiff, employer, and employee - there are
significant differences between the two theories of recovery.23 The
most salient distinction is that under respondeat superior the
employer is vicariously liable for the employee's tort.24 In contrast,
under negligent hiring the employer is primarily liable for the tort of
hiring an unfit employee. 25 One consequence of this distinction is
that although an award of punitive damages against an employer
who is vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior is
18. Curley v. General Valet Serv., Inc., 270 Md. 248, 253, 311 A.2d 231, 235 (1973).
In Curley, a vehicle owner entrusted his van to an employee with knowledge
that the employee was driving it on personal business, that his past driving
record was "bad," and that he had ignored traffic control devices. The court
held that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of whether
the employee's driving violations were so habitual as to constitute incompe-
tence and thus render the vehicle owner liable for negligent entrustment. Id.
Accord, State ex rel. Weaver v. O'Brien, 140 F. Supp. 306 (D. Md. 1956);
Snowhite v. State ex rel. Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 221 A.2d 342 (1966); Round v.
Phillips, 168 Md. 120, 123-27, 177 A. 174, 175-76 (1935).
19. Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C. 1951).
20. Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment, supra note 13, at 301-05. See,
e.g., Elliott v. A.J. Smith Contracting Co., 358 Mich. 398, 100 N.W.2d 257
(1960); Tuite v. Union Pac. Stages, Inc., 204 Or. 565, 284 P.2d 333 (1955).
21. Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 372, 379 (1954).
22. Drug Fair, Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971); Lewis v.
Accelerated Transport-Pony Express, Inc., 219 Md. 252, 148 A.2d 783 (1959);
Rusnack v. Giant Food, Inc., 26 Md. App. 250, 337 A.2d 445 (1975).
23. See Loftus, Employer's Duty to Know Deficiencies of Employees, 16 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REV. 143, 145 (1967); 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS (SECOND) Lack of Care in
Hiring 609, 614-15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as AM. JUR. POF].
24. E.g., Lewis v. Accelerated Transport-Pony Express, Inc., 219 Md. 252, 148 A.2d
783, 785 (1959); see Brill, The Liability of an Employer for the Wilful Torts of
His Servants, 45 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1968).
25. E.g., Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192 Kan. 360, 367, 388 P.2d 824,
829-30 (1964) (employer's liability for retaining a servant likely to commit an
assault rests- upon personal fault in exposing others to unreasonable risk of
injury in violation of employer's duty to exercise care for the public's




unwarranted,26 such damages may be awarded against an employer
charged with gross negligence in the employment of an incompetent
individual. 27 The doctrines of respondeat superior and negligent
hiring can be further differentiated in that unlike respondeat
superior, negligent hiring does not require the act of the employee
that triggers liability to occur within the scope of employment.28 In
addition, when the plaintiff's injury is occasioned by an employee's
intentional tort, and the action is brought under the theory of
negligent hiring, the plaintiff usually will enjoy a longer period
under the statute of limitations. 29 Another important distinction
between the two theories lies in the area of evidence. In an action
based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, evidence of the
employee's reputation and prior specific acts of negligence is
inadmissible. 0 On the other hand, where the basis of the proceeding
is the employer's alleged negligence in hiring or retaining an
employee, the fitness and capacity of the employee are material
issues and evidence bearing on such matters is admissible.3 1
Respondeat superior, negligent entrustment, and negligent
hiring are three distinct theories of liability available to a plaintiff
seeking damages against an employer for injuries sustained as a
result of an employee's tortious conduct.2 Not all jurisdictions,
however, have acknowledged negligent hiring as an independent
legal avenue by which a member of the general public may proceed
26. Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285, 194 P.2d 281
(1948).
27. E.g., Eifeit v. Bush, 51 Misc. 2d 248, 272 N.Y.S.2d 862, modified on other
grounds, 27 A.D.2d 950, 279 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1967), aff'd, 22 N.Y.2d 681, 238
N.E.2d 759, 291 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1968); Wilson N. Jones Memorial Hosp. v.
Davis, 553 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. 1977). See 53 AM. JUR. (SECOND) Master and
Servant § 422 (1970).
28. La Lone v. Smith, 39 Wash. 2d 167, 234 P.2d 893 (1951). See, e.g., North, The
Responsibility of Employers for the Actions of Their Employees: The Negligent
Hiring Theory of Liability, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 717 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
North].
29. See, e.g., Murray v. Modoc State Bank, 181 Kan. 642, 645-46, 313 P.2d 304,
307 (1957). Compare MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-105 (1980) (an
action for assault, battery, libel, or slander shall be filed within one year from
date it accrues) with MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1980) (a civil
action must be filed within three years from date it accrues).
30. E.g., Parkinson v. Syracuse Transit Corp., 279 A.D. 848, 109 N.Y.S.2d 777
(1952); Saunders v. Williams & Co., 155 Or. 1, 7, 62 P.2d 260, 263 (1936)
(liability of the master rests on the negligence of the servant at the time of the
incident, and therefore prior incidents are not elements in the case).
31. E.g., Broadstreet v. Hall, 168 Ind. 192, 204, 80 N.E. 145, 149 (1907) (evidence
regarding employee's actions on prior occasions is admissible to prove the
employee's incompetence and the employer's knowledge of such); Guedon v.
Rooney, 160 Or. 621, 641-42, 87 P.2d 209, 217 (1939) (same).
32. Indiana has taken the unique position that the theories of respondeat superior
and negligent hiring are mutually exclusive. See Lange v. B & P Motor
Express, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Ind. 1966); Tindall v. Enderle, 162 Ind.
App. 524, 320 N.E.2d 764 (1974). Therefore, if the parties stipulate that the
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against an employer.33 Therefore, it is important to note at the outset
that, through Evans, Maryland has now aligned itself with the
majority position, which recognizes the theory of negligent hiring as




A. The Theory of Negligent Hiring
Negligent hiring is predicated on the negligence of an employer
in placing a person with certain known propensities in an employ-
ment position in which it should have been foreseen that the
individual posed a threat to others.3" Upon the initiation of an action
for negligent hiring, the plaintiff faces the rebuttable presumption
that the employer used due care in hiring the employee.36 Thus, in
order to recover, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the employer breached his duty to use due care in the
selection or retention of the servant.37
doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable, the theory of negligent hiring is
no longer available as an appropriate cause of action. In light of the court's
notation in Evans that it was not considering the doctrines of respondeat
superior and negligent entrustment only because neither had been raised by
the plaintiff, it does not appear that Maryland has adopted Indiana's narrow
approach to alternative pleading. Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 164 n.2, 395
A.2d 480, 482-83 n.2 (1978).
33. See, e.g., Lewis v. Southern Pac. Co., 102 Ariz. 108, 425 P.2d 840 (1967); Denver
City Tramway Co. v. Cowan, 51 Colo. 64, 116 P. 136 (1911); Black v. Hunt, 96
Conn. 663, 115 A. 429 (1921); Carlson v. Connecticut Co., 94 Conn. 131, 108 A.
531 (1919); Everingham v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 148 Iowa 662, 127 N.W.
1009 (1910); Central Truckaway Sys., Inc. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 553, 201 S.W.2d
725 (1947); Mandel v. Byram, 191 Wis. 446, 211 N.W. 145 (1926).
34. See, e.g., Becken v. Manpower, Inc.,532 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1976); Kendall v. Gore
Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Texas Breeders & Racing Ass'n v.
Blanchard, 81 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1936); Svacek v. Shelley, 359 P.2d 127 (Alaska
1961); Najera v. Southern Pac. Co., 191 Cal. App. 2d 634, 13 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1961); Mallory v. O'Neil, 69 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1954); Nines v. Bell, 104 Ga. App.
76, 120 S.E.2d 892 (1961); Abraham v. S.E. Onorato Garages, 50 Hawaii 628,
446 P.2d 821 (1968); Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d
824 (1964); Strawder v. Harrall, 251 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 1971); Priest v. F.W.
Woolworth Five & Ten Cent Stores, 228 Mo. App. 23, 62 S.W.2d 926 (1933);
Bennett v. T & F Distrib. Co., 117 N.J. Super. 439, 285 A.2d 59 (1971), cert.
denied, 60 N.J. 350, 289 A.2d 795 (1972); Vanderhule v. Berinstein, 285 A.D.
290, 136 N.Y.S.2d 95, modified, 284 A.D. 1089, 136 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1954);
Wegner v. Delly-Land Delicatessen, Inc., 270 N.C. 62, 153 S.E.2d 804 (1967);
Mistleton Express Serv., Inc. v. Culp, 353 P.2d 9 (Okla. 1959); Guedon v.
Rooney, 160 Or. 621, 87 P.2d 209 (1939); Wishone v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Tenn.
App. 229, 97 S.W.2d 452 (1936).
35. See, e.g., Henderson v. Nolting First Mortgage Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 731-32, 193
S.E. 347, 353 (1937); Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192 Kan. 360, 367, 388
P.2d 824, 829 (1964).
36. Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 165, 395 A.2d 480, 483 (1978) (citing Norfolk &
W. R.R. v. Hoover, 79 Md. 253, 263, 29 A. 994, 995 (1894)).
37. Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 562, 46 N.W.2d 382, 384 (1951). See North,
supra note 28, at 721-26.
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In order to establish a prima facie case for negligent hiring, the
plaintiff must substantiate the existence of five elements." It is
axiomatic that it must be shown that an employment relationship
existed between the defendant and the person whose act or omission
caused the plaintiff's injury.39 Second, the plaintiff must prove that
the employee was unfit,40 considering the nature of the employment
and the risk posed by the employee to those who would foreseeably
associate with him.41 An employee may be incompetent for his task
due to a lack of training and experience, 42 a physical or mental
infirmity,4 3 frequent intoxication," constant forgetfulness, 45 habitual
carelessness, 46 continual inattentiveness, 47 a propensity for
horseplay,4 recklessness,49 or maliciousness. 50 Third, the plaintiff
must prove that the employer knew or should have known of the
employee's incompetency." Fourth, the employee's act or omission
38. AM. JUR. POF, supra note 23, at 609.
39. Id. at 615. See, e.g., Pascoe v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 41 Ill. App. 2d 52, 57, 190
N.E.2d 156, 158 (1963); Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of
Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 887, 895-98 (1934).
40. Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment, supra note 13, at 298-99.
41. See Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. App. 1980);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 213, Comment d (1958).
42. E.g., Mezyk v. National Repossessions, Inc., 241 Or. 333, 405 P.2d 840 (1965);
Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Davis, 45 S.W. 956 (Tex. Civ. App.) (locomotive
engineer with only four months experience assigned to engine propelling "wild"
train), rev'd on other grounds, 92 Tex. 372, 48 S.W. 570 (1898).
43. E.g., Bensman v. Reed, 299 Ill. App. 531, 20 N.E.2d 910 (1939). But see Texas &
P. Ry. v. Harrington, 62 Tex. 597 (1884) (employment of man who is
nearsighted as locomotive engineer is not necessarily negligence because his
defect might be remedied by using eyeglasses).
44. E.g., Layzell v. J.H. Sommers Coal Co., 156 Mich. 268, 117 N.W. 179 (1908),
aff'd on rehearing, 156 Mich. 268, 120 N.W. 996 (1909); Guedon v. Rooney, 160
Or. 621, 87 P.2d 209 (1939); El Paso & S.W. Ry. v. Smith, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 10,
108 S.W. 988 (1908) (intemperate foreman of switching crew).
45. E.g., Ledwidge v. Hathaway, 170 Mass. 348, 49 N.E. 656 (1898).
46. E.g., Houston & T.C. Ry. v. Patton, 9 S.W. 175 (Tex. 1888); Johansen v. Pioneer
Mining Co., 77 Wash. 421, 137 P. 1019 (1914).
47. E.g., Yazoo & M.V. Ry. v. Hare, 104 Miss. 564, 61 So. 648 (1913); Walters v.
Durham Lumber Co., 163 N.C. 536, 80 S.E. 49 (1913); Ragley Lumber Co. v.
Parks, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 539, 103 S.W. 424 (1907).
48. E.g., Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824 (1964)
(employee's act consisted of a prank involving rude, boisterous play with no
intention to do bodily harm).
49. E.g., Rosenstiel v. Pittsburgh Rys., 230 Pa. 273, 79 A. 556 (1911); Serdan v.
Palk Co., 153 Wis. 169, 140 N.W. 1035 (1913).
50. E.g., Svacek v. Shelley, 359 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1961); Murray v. Modoc State
Bank, 181 Kan. 642, 313 P.2d 304 (1957) (quarrelsome and dangerous person is"unfit" for employment); Kelly v. Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., 183 Or. 1, 189
P.2d 105 (1948).
51. See, e.g, Sixty-Six, Inc. v. Finley, 224 So. 2d 381 (Fla. App. 1969); Abraham v.
S.E. Onorato Garages, 50 Hawaii 628, 632, 446 P.2d 821, 824 (1968) (citing
Stumper v. Harris, 136 A.2d 870 (D.C. 1957)); Bennett v. T & F Distrib. Co.,
117 N.J. Super. 439, 442, 285 A.2d 59, 60 (1971). But see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. v. Newby, 145 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1944) (plaintiff must establish that
employer had actual knowledge of employee's incompetence); Hines v. Bell, 104
Ga. App. 76, 83, 120 S.E.2d 892, 897 (1961) (same).
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must be the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries. 2 Finally, the
plaintiff must establish that the hiring of the employee was the
proximate cause of his injuries.0
The most frequently litigated issue in an action for negligent
hiring is the third element: whether the employer had actual or
constructive knowledge of the servant's incompetence. The employer
is required to make an adequate inquiry or to have some other
sufficient basis for relying upon the employee as suitable for the
position.5 A foundation for determining an applicant's fitness may
be secured through an investigation of his background or references,
previous work experience with the applicant, or other personal
knowledge.5  The character and extent of the inquiry will vary with
the circumstances of each case." One factor in determining the
requisite scope of the investigation is the nature of the employment
involved. 7 This is illustrated in Kendall v. Gore Properties5 in which
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit stated,
Slight care might be expected as to the employment of a
yard man, not ordinarily to be sent into a tenant's apart-
ment. But a very different series of steps are justified if an
employee is to be sent, after hours, to work for protracted
periods in the apartment of a young woman tenant, living
alone.59
Similarly, if the plaintiff is unusually dependent upon the compe-
tence of the defendant's employees, for instance where the defendant
is a common carrier or hospital, the employer is required to conduct
an exhaustive investigation before hiring an employee. 60 Although
the owner of a place of public accommodation also owes a duty of
52. Am. JUR. POF, supra note 23, at 615.
53. E.g., Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Linden
v. City Car Co., 239 Wis. 236, 300 N.W. 925 (1941); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 359,
361 (1973); 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 559 (1948).
54. Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. App. 1980); Evans v.
Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 166-67, 395 A.2d 480, 484 (1978).
55. E.g., Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
56. Id. at 678; Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 167, 395 A.2d 480, 484 (1978).
57. Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment, supra note 13, at 299; see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 307, Comment a (1965).
58. 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
59. Id. at 678. Cf. McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d'419 (1947)
(when a patrolman who is required to carry a revolver at all times is known to
have vicious proclivities, it is a factual determination as to whether his
retention in police service involved a reasonably foreseeable danger to the
public).
60. See Loftus, Employer's Duty to Know Deficiencies of Employees, 16 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REV. 143, 143-44 (1967).
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protection to his patrons, the nature of this duty is different in
degree from that imposed upon a hospital or common carrier. This
distinction arises because a patron, unlike a patient or passenger, is
not completely subject to the control of the owner of the enterprise.
In this respect, an innkeeper will have satisfied his obligation to
exercise reasonable care when hiring employees if he has conducted
a less sweeping investigation than that required of a hospital or
common carrier.6' A second criterion involved in the determination of
the requisite scope of an employer's inquiry is the degree of risk to
persons who will foreseeably come into contact with the employee
should he prove to be incompetent.62 The employer is required to
examine each particular employment situation to determine whether
it subjects persons to an unreasonable degree of harm. In filling
positions that involve a great risk of harm, an employer will be held
to a high level of care and will be expected to conduct an exhaustive
inquiry.63 On the other hand, if the risk is minimal, the duty imposed
upon the employer is satisfied by a minimal inquiry.6' At the very
least, however, an employer will be bound by an irrebuttable
presumption of knowledge of his employee's general reputation.
65
It is unreasonable for an employer to fail to conduct a
pre-employment investigation, and such failure automatically con-
stitutes a breach of the employer's duty.66 In Kendall, the court held
that the employer's failure to make even a cursory inquiry
represented an almost purposeful refusal to discover anything about
the employee, and the employer would be liable for those injuries
occasioned by characteristics of the employee that a reasonable
investigation would have revealed. If a reasonable investigation
61. See Vanderhule v. Berinstein, 285 A.D. 290, 294, 136 N.Y.S.2d 95, 100,
modified, 284 A.D. 1089, 136 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1954). See generally Annot., 34
A.L.R.2d 372 (1954).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213, Comment d (1958); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 307, Comment a (1965).
63. E.g., Hipp v. Hospital Auth., 104 Ga. App. 174, 121 S.E.2d 273 (1961).
64. See Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C. 1951); Tyus v. Booth, 64 Mich.
App. 88, 235 N.W.2d 69 (1975) (gasoline station employer not required to
conduct in-depth background investigation of his employees; only required to
use reasonable care to assure that employees do not unreasonably expose the
public to danger).
65. Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Hoover, 79 Md. 253, 29 A. 994 (1894). In Norfolk, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland stated:
If the servant's general reputation before employment is so notorious as
to unfitness as that it must have been known to the master but for his
the master's negligence in not informing himself - if he could have
been ignorant of it only because he failed to make investigation - then,
it is obvious that he had not used the care and caution which the law
demands of him in selecting his employees.
Id. at 263, 29 A. at 996.
66. E.g., Weiss v. Furniture in the Raw, 62 Misc. 2d 283, 306 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1969).
67. 236 F.2d 673, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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would not have revealed that the employee was incompetent, a
plaintiff may be unable to recover even though the employee was
unfit for the job.' Furthermore, when an employer conducts an
investigation and discovers that the applicant is incompetent or has
vicious proclivities, if the employer hires the individual, the
employer will be responsible for any damages proximately caused by
characteristics disclosed to the employer as a result of the inquiry.
69
Recovery is precluded if an investigation reveals that an employee
has a history of committing one type of offense and the employee
subsequently commits an offense of a different type. For example,
employment of a person known to have been convicted of intoxica-
tion does not render an employer liable when the employee commits
a theft.0 Nor is an employer liable when a male employee known to
have been convicted of nonsupport sexually assaults a female
customer."
Another frequent source of litigation is the fifth element of the
prima facie case: whether the hiring of the employee was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. This issue is best dealt
with in the form of the question, "was the defendant under a duty to
protect the plaintiff against the event which did in fact occur?"72
When there is no duty owed by the employer to another, there can be
no negligence in retaining a servant with known vicious propensities
because the hiring of such an employee is not the proximate cause of
any injury sustained.73 In Hansen v. Cohen,74 for example, an action
was brought by a patron against parking lot operators for damages
resulting from an assault allegedly committed by the attendant in
charge of the lot. The plaintiff alleged that the operators were
negligent in hiring an employee with vicious propensities. The court
concluded that, because the plaintiff had been playing dice with the
employee when the assault occurred, he had lost the status of invitee
and had become a mere licensee to whom the employer only owed a
duty to avoid inflicting willful or wanton injury, and therefore, the
68. E.g., Stevens v. Lankard, 31 A.D.2d 602, 297 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1968), aff'd, 25
N.Y.2d 640, 254 N.E.2d 339, 306 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1969) (employer not negligent
when routine check would not have revealed employee's prior sodomy
conviction in another jurisdiction).
69. E.g., Svacek v. Shelley, 359 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1961).
70. E.g., Argonne Apartment House Co. v. Garrison, 42 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir.
1930) (prior conviction for intoxication did not put employer on notice that
employee might be dishonest).
71. E.g., Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 46 N.W.2d 382 (1951); cf. Strawder v.
Harrall, 251 So. 2d 514, 518 (La. App. 1971) (employer who hired a man he
knew was on parole was not liable when the employee shot a customer).
72. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 244 (4th ed. 1971).
73. E.g., Vanderhule v. Berinstein, 285 A.D. 290, 294, 136 N.Y.S.2d 95, 100,
modified, 284 A.D. 1089, 136 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1954); Hansen v. Cohen, 203 Or.
157, 163. 276 P.2d 391. 394 (1954).
74. 203 Or. 157, 276 P.2d 391 (1954).
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plaintiff's action premised upon negligent hiring was untenable. 5 In
Insurance Co. of North America v. Hewitt-Robbins, Inc.,7 6 the
defendant loaned a car to his employee for the employee's personal
use. Although a subsequent collision with the plaintiffs vehicle was
caused in fact by the employee's negligence, the court found that the
connection between the employment relationship and the collision
was too tenuous to support the defendant's liability.77 Employing a
"staleness" doctrine, courts have also found a break in the chain of
proximate causation when the passage of time serves to vitiate the
significance of an employee's earlier action with regard to his
present tendencies.78 This is illustrated in Abraham v. S.E. Onorato
Garages"9 in which the court held that a single hit and run
conviction, which occurred four years before the employee's promo-
tion, was insufficient to permit the jury to conclude that the
employee was so incompetent that his retention constituted negli-
gent hiring."
B. Application of the Theory ofNegligentHiring- The Evans Decision
Since 1894, it has been well established in Maryland that a
master owes a duty to his servants to use reasonable care in the
selection and retention of fellow servants.8" An employer is obligated
to provide reasonably safe working conditions for his employees and
this duty includes "avoiding the employment or retention of a
servant who is known to be dangerous or vicious where such
propensities are calculated to expose co-employees to greater dangers
than the work necessarily entails."'82 In Evans, the court noted that
this duty to use reasonable care exists not only with regard to other
employees, but also with regard to the general public., Therefore, it
75. Id. at 163, 276 P.2d at 394.
76. 13 Ill. App. 3d 534, 301 N.E.2d 78 (1973).
77. Id. (court refused to extend negligent hiring theory to employee engaged in a
"collateral" act to employment at the time of the incident). Accord, Linden v.
City Car Co., 239 Wis. 236, 300 N.W. 925 (1941) (court denied plaintiff's claim
under negligent hiring for damages sustained as a result of an assault by agent
of defendant, holding that because plaintiff was not a customer of defendant
taxi cab company, but merely a redcap assisting defendant's passengers, the
tortfeasor's employment was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries).
78. E.g., Abraham v. S.E. Onorato Garages, 50 Hawaii 628, 446 P.2d 821 (1968);
accord, RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Newby, 145 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1944).
79. 50 Hawaii 628, 446 P.2d 821 (1968).
80. Id.
81. Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Hoover, 79 Md. 253, 29 A. 994 (1894) (railroad liable to
engineman in its employ for injuries he sustained when co-employee, a
brakeman who drank heavily, failed to heed signals warning him to slow the
train); accord, Northern Pac. R.R. v. Mares, 123 U.S. 710 (1887). See also 1 C.
LABATT, LAW OF MASTER & SERVANT 177 (1904).
82. Country Club of Jackson v. Turner, 192 Miss. 510, 514, 4 So. 2d 718, 719 (1941).
83. 284 Md. 160, 164-65, 395 A.2d 480, 483 (1978).
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is clear that the perimeter of the doctrine of negligent hiring in
Maryland was extended in Evans to encompass suits by members of
the general public who have been injured by incompetent employees.
The facts in Evans reveal that of the five requisite elements of
negligent hiring, four were present. It is evident that an employment
relationship existed between the defendant, Morsell, and the tort-
feasor, Hopkins. Because of the bartender's several convictions for
assault, it is also evident that the tortfeasor possessed vicious
propensities and therefore was unfit for the position. In addition, the
facts indicate that Hopkins' actions were both the cause-in-fact and
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The questions of
cause-in-fact and proximate causation would only arise if the court
found that the defendant had been negligent in the selection and
retention of Hopkins.84 The query would then be whether that
negligence was causally connected with the assault. On that issue
there could be little doubt because the risk of assault upon a patron
is well within the range of the foreseeable consequences of retaining
a potentially dangerous bartender. Thus, an analysis of the elements
that must be established in order to recover in an action based upon
the theory of negligent hiring indicates that the court in Evans
focused its attention upon. the third element. The court stated that in
cases, such as Evans, in which an employee has committed an
intentional tort upon a member of the public, the critical standard is
"whether the employer knew or should have known that the
individual was potentially dangerous."85
The employer's duty to use reasonable care in hiring and
retaining employees was interpreted by the court as requiring the
employer either to make an adequate inquiry into the employee's
competence or to have some other sufficient basis for relying upon
the employee.86 In Evans an inquiry was made. The inquiry did not,
however, reveal any facts that placed or should have placed the
tavern owner on notice that the bartender was potentially
dangerous. 7 Thus, it was necessary to determine whether the scope
of this investigation was sufficient to avoid a breach of duty. The
court held that, based upon the recommendation of Hopkins' former
84. Because the court in Evans concluded that Morsell was not negligent in the
hiring and retention of Hopkins, it did not address the issues of cause-in-fact
and proximate causation. Accord, Vanderhule v. Berinstein, 285 A.D. 290, 294,
136 N.Y.S.2d 95, 100, modified, 284 A.D. 1089, 136 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1954).
85. 284 Md. 160, 165, 395 A.2d 480, 483 (1978). Accord, Vanderhule v. Berinstein,
285 A.D. 290, 293, 136 N.Y.S.2d 95, 100, modified, 284 A.D. 1089, 136 N.Y.S.2d
349 (1954) (ultimate duty of employer is to refrain from hiring or retaining
anyone who he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known
was potentially dangerous).
86. 284 Md. 160, 166-67, 395 A.2d 480, 484 (1978). See text accompanying notes
54-71 supra.
87. 284 Md. 160, 168, 395 A.2d 480, 484-85 (1978).
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employer and the defendant's prior personal knowledge of Hopkins,
the defendant had satisfied his duty to make a reasonable inquiry
and had a sufficient basis for relying on the employee.8 The court
concluded that there was no evidence that Morsell knew or should
have known that Hopkins was potentially dangerous and, therefore,
the defendant was not liable under the doctrine of negligent hiring.9
The court rejected the plaintiffs contention that a tavern owner
has a duty to inquire into a potential employee's criminal record
when the employee is to deal regularly with the public.90 In support
of this conclusion, the court noted that there was no custom among
bar owners in the area of investigating the criminal history of job
applicants. 9 Following the majority of jurisdictions,92 the court
stated that an employer who deals with the public is bound to use
only reasonable care in the selection of his employees,9 and that this
obligation is satisfied without an investigation of the applicant's
criminal history when the employer makes an adequate inquiry or
88. Id.
89. Id. In Blum v. National Serv. Indus., Law No. 37,669 (Cir. Ct. Mont. Co., Md.
1975), the trial court instructed the jury on the issue of negligent hiring as
follows:
The question is did the company owe any duty to the general public
to use reasonable diligence to see that those who are in its employ and
to whom the general public is exposed shall not be guilty of any act
which might reasonably be called dangerous and liable to result in
injury to persons who are exposed to such employees as a result of their
employment, when by the exercise of reasonable diligence on the part of
the defendant it could have prevented the acts ....
A principal may be negligent because he has reason to know of a
dangerous quality of an agent which quality may be his vicious
disposition, and if a principal, without exercising due care in selection,
employs a vicious person to do an act which necessarily brings him in
contact with others while in the performance of a duty, he is subject to
liability for harm caused by the vicious propensity....
You are instructed that simply because a person has a record of
conviction of a felony it is not negligent to hire him. There must be
proof that at the time he was hired he was, in fact, a person of known
vicious and dangerous propensities so that the particular injury should
have been foreseen as reasonably likely to happen if he were hired.
90. 284 Md. 160, 167, 395 A.2d 480, 484 (1978). See generally Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d
359 (1973).
91. 284 Md. 160, 163, 395 A.2d 480, 482 (1978).
92. E.g., Abraham v. S.E. Onorato Garages, 50 Hawaii 628, 633, 446 P.2d 821,
825-26 (1968); Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 562-63, 46 N.W.2d 382,
384-85 (1951); Stevens v. Lankard, 31 A.D.2d 602, 603, 297 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688
(1968), affd, 25 N.Y.2d 640, 254 N.E.2d 339, 306 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1969).
93. But cf. Hipp v. Hospital Auth., 104 Ga. App. 174, 176-77, 121 S.E.2d 273, 275
(1961) (hospital must take special precautions, selecting only competent
employees, because a patient is under complete control of employee and a
patient's right of privacy must necessarily be invaded in order to provide
treatment and care); Vanderhule v. Berinstein, 285 A.D. 290, 296-97, 136
N.Y.S.2d 95, 103, modified, 284 A.D. 1089, 136 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1954) (common
carrier must be certain to select only competent employees because a passenger
entrusts his safety to the carrier and has very little ability to control the risks
involved in his transportation).
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otherwise has a sufficient basis for believing that the employee is
competent.
9 4
The court provided three justifications for its holding that an
employer ordinarily has no duty to inquire into the criminal record
of a prospective employee. One reason was that "when one has
completed a criminal sentence or has been paroled, the employer to
some extent is entitled to rely upon the determination of the
government's criminal justice system that the individual is ready to
again become an active member of society."95 Although this proposi-
tion has been relied upon by other courts,9' the United States
Supreme Court 97 and numerous scholars have acknowledged that in
actual practice rehabilitative achievement is almost nonexistent.98
94. 284 Md. 160, 167-68, 395 A.2d 480, 484-85 (1978). Accord, Williams v.
Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. App. 1980). See text accompanying
notes 54-65 supra. Because the defendant was found to have satisfied his duty
to exercise reasonable care in the selection of Hopkins, the court in Evans had
no need to analyze the remaining factors necessary to establish a cause of
action based upon negligent hiring. But see Blum v. National Serv. Indus., Law
No. 37,669 (Cir. Ct. Mont. Co., Md. 1975). In Blum, the defendant, National
Service Industries (NSI), hired Watson as a furniture mover merely on the
recommendation of another employee whose name was not recalled or recorded
and without conducting any pre-employment screening. If NSI had done an
employment check, it would have discovered that Watson was on parole from a
conviction of armed robbery, that he had never held any job over six months,
and that according to his parole officer he was having some trouble with
alcohol. While on the job, Watson was sent into an apartment building to pick
up furniture. The employee, who was in an extremely intoxicated state, forced
entry into the adjacent apartment where he violently assaulted and murdered
the tenant, Mrs. Blum. Because the tortfeasor in Blum had strayed from the
physical location of his employment, and because the plaintiff's decedent was
neither a customer nor an invitee of the employer, the case would have posed
an interesting query for the court of appeals - whether the plaintiff had
established that the employer's negligence in hiring or retaining Watson was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries? The case was settled, however,
before oral argument in the court of appeals.
95. 284 Md. 160, 167, 395 A.2d 480, 484 (1978).
96. E.g., Strawder v. Harrall, 251 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 1971); see Comment,
Employment of Former Criminals, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 306 (1970). But see Hersh
v. Kentfield Builders, 385 Mich. 410, 189 N.W.2d 286 (1971) (concern for
ex-criminal's welfare must be balanced against the community's welfare).
97. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), Justice Powell noted that an
individual's exposure to overcrowded penal institutions "has a destructive
effect on human character and makes the rehabilitation of the individual
offender much more difficult." Id. at 520. Furthermore, it is estimated that 45%
of all parolees "are subjected to revocation and return to prison." Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972).
98. See, e.g., ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE, A PROGRAM FOR
PRISON REFORM: THE FINAL REPORT (1972) (the conference credited the lack of




Thus, this rationalization for the court's conclusion lacks
foundation. 9
Another justification for the court's finding that there is
ordinarily no duty to check a job applicant's criminal history was
that to make such an investigation mandatory would impose a
significant burden upon employers. 00 This rationale was employed in
the New York case of Stevens v. Lankard,'°1 in which the court
concluded that such a requirement would place an unfair burden
upon the business community. 12 Application of this line of reasoning
in Evans does not withstand scrutiny, however, because at the time
Hopkins was hired, only the employee could have obtained a
certified copy of his police record. 10 3 Therefore, the prospective
employee would have had to bear the burden of securing the
information, not the employer.
Finally, the Evans court noted that "it may today be quite
difficult to obtain criminal records. 0 4 This statement appears to be
an allusion to recent Maryland legislation entitled The Criminal
Justice Information System Act,"0 5 which governs the dissemination
of criminal history record information. 1" This law, which was passed
in 1976 pursuant to The Federal Criminal Justice Information
System, 0 7 provides that it is unlawful for any employer to require
a person to furnish a copy of his criminal history record in order to
qualify for employment.' 8 The Federal Criminal Justice Information
System mandates that such information may be disseminated by
appropriate state law, executive order, local ordinance, or court rule,
decision, or order."9 The responsive Maryland legislation inexpli-
99. The Evans court acknowledged the limitations of its reasoning and noted that
there are overriding considerations such as "the sensitivity of the position, the
nature of the past criminal conduct, and the surrounding circumstances." 284
Md. 160, 167 n.5, 395 A.2d 480, 484 n.5 (1978).
100. Id. at 167-68, 395 A.2d at 484.
101. 31 A.D.2d 602, 297 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1968), aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 640, 254 N.E.2d 339,
306 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1969).
102. Id. Accord, Tyus v. Booth, 64 Mich. App. 88, 235 N.W.2d 69 (1975).
103. Brief for Appellant at E-30 to E-32, Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 395 A.2d
480 (1978).
104. 284 Md. 160, 167, 395 A.2d 480, 484 (1978).
105. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 742-755 (1976).
106. The court's opinion in Evans did not expressly refer to this Act. One possible
explanation is that, although the statute was in effect at the time the court
rendered its decision, it was not to be applied retroactively and therefore was
inapplicable to the facts in Evans.
107. DOJ Criminal Justice Information Systems, 28 C.F.R. §§ 20.1-.38 (1979). These
regulations were promulgated pursuant to §§ 501 & 524(b) of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 3789(g)
(Supp. 1979).
108. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 754(a). This section provides: "It is unlawful for any
employer or prospective employer to require a person to inspect or challenge
any criminal history record information relating to that person for the purpose
of obtaining a copy of the person's record in order to qualify for employment"
(emphasis added).
109. DOJ Criminal Justice Information Systems, 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(b) (1979).
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cably affords no guidance with respect to dissemination. Rather,
section 749 of Maryland's Criminal Justice Information System Act
provides in a circuitous manner that dissemination of criminal
history record information is to be in accordance with the applicable
federal law and regulations. It is important to note that the court
qualified its holding in Evans by stating "that an employer
ordinarily has no duty to inquire concerning the possible criminal
record of a prospective employee." 110 Therefore, although Maryland
to date has not designated any grounds for allowing the dissemina-
tion of criminal record information to employers, it is possible that
such authorization could arise in the future. In the final analysis, it
is evident that the Evans decision, which concerned a 1975 incident,
was rendered so as to be consistent with Maryland's Criminal
Justice Information System Act of 1976.111
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF EVANS
The Evans decision is best viewed as one that balances the
competing interests of employees, employers, and the general
public." 2 In the wake of the court's holding that an employer
ordinarily need not inquire into an applicant's criminal record before
hiring him and the recently enacted Maryland Criminal Justice
Information System Act, it is clear that at the present time the
employee is given the most protection. Maryland enacted The
Criminal Justice Information System Act"3 in response to the
Federal Criminal Justice Information System, which was prom-
ulgated "to assure that criminal history record information wherever
it appears is collected, stored, and disseminated in a manner to
insure the completeness, integrity, accuracy and security of such
information and to protect individual privary."4 The explanatory
comments to the federal regulation note that it is imperative that
employers be prohibited access to a prospective employee's criminal
record in order to prevent applicants from having the unenviable
.choice between invasion of privacy or loss of possible job
opportunities.'15
110. 284 Md. 160, 167, 395 A.2d 480, 484 (1978) (emphasis added).
111. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 742-755 (1976).
112. See, e.g., Bennett v. T & F Distrib. Co., 177 N.J. Super. 439, 285 A.2d 59 (1971).
113. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 742-755 (1976). See text accompanying notes 105-08
supra.
114. DOJ Criminal Justice Information Systems, 28 C.F.R. § 20.1 (1979) (emphasis
added).
115. Id. Commentary on Selected Sections of the Regulations on Criminal History
Record Information Systems, 28 C.F.R. app. §§ 20.21(b), 20.21(c) (2) (1979); see
also The Daily Record, May 1, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
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With regard to the employer's interest, while Evans broadens
the scope of employer liability, the narrow holding that an employer
ordinarily need not inquire into a job applicant's criminal record
serves to limit the employer's duty to investigate. It is obvious that
the court considered the time and expense that an exhaustive
background investigation would impose upon the business commun-
ity. In this respect, although a person has a right to be secure in his
business transactions"6 and to feel confident that the employer has
hired competent employees,"7 the courts have held that in most
circumstances an employer satisfies his duty of reasonable care by
conducting only a minimal inquiry into the background of employees
he selects or retains. 118
Finally, the public's interest has also been fostered through the
Evans decision. It is now clear that an employer must have a
sufficient basis for believing that an applicant is competent and fit
for employment before hiring the prospective employee. If an
employer violates this duty and a third person is injured, the
negligent employer must answer for compensatory and, possibly,
punitive damages. The public may enjoy another benefit as a result
of the court of appeals' decision. One commentator has asserted that
the difficulty ex-offenders encounter in the job market is "the chief
causative factor" of recidivism." 9 It is further noted that "each
refusal to hire an ex-criminal contributes to a massive barrier to
employment and thus encourages recidivism, which in turn justifies
the next refusal to hire."'120 Because members of the public are the
victims of crime, the breaking of this vicious cycle would clearly
inure to the public welfare. The court of appeals' decision diminishes
the likelihood that ex-offenders who would make fit employees will
be denied jobs merely because of the stigma attached to having a
criminal record.
VI. CONCLUSION
Evans v. Morsell marks the first recognition by a Maryland
appellate court that an employer owes a duty to the public to use
reasonable care in the selection and retention of employees. In
accordance with Evans, an employer must ascertain the fitness of
persons he employs, and if he is negligent in this task, he may be
116. North, supra note 28, at 729.
117. See Bennett v. T & F Distrib. Co., 117 N.J. Super. 439, 285 A.2d 59 (1971).
118. E.g., Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Weiss v.
Furniture in the Raw, 62 Misc. 2d 283, 306 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1969); North, supra
note 28, at 726.
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liable for injuries that result from the actions of the negligently
hired servant. The question of what constitutes a reasonable inquiry,
however, has not been adequately answered by the court. Because
the requisite investigation varies with the facts and circumstances of
each case, only through future court decisions and legislation will
the requirements necessary to satisfy this nebulous duty take form.
Nonetheless, the court in Evans explicitly held that ordinarily this
duty does not include an inquiry into the employee's criminal record
and, in fact, as a result of recent Maryland legislation, an inquiry
that directs an employee to provide a copy of his criminal record is at
present expressly forbidden by statute.
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